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On the ‘strudel 
and apples’ theory 
of historiography: 
A reply to Chris 
Lorenz
Aviezer Tucker
University of Texas, Austin
This collection of Chris Lorenz’s essays on the 
philosophy of historiography and the history of 
historiography is a valuable addition to the al-
ready growing library of translated and origi-
nal books on the philosophy of historiography 
published in Poznań, in the larger West Slavic 
dialect. I wish such a collection of books was 
available in one of the smaller West Slavic di-
alects.
Lorenz’s work in the last quarter century re-
flects the tensions between the two previously 
dominant approaches to the philosophy of his-
toriography, the positivism of the 1940s and 50s, 
and the narrative analysis of the 70s and 80s. 
Lorenz has been trying to overcome both and 
offer an alternative. He has also rooted his phi-
losophy of historiography in historiography by 
applying it to concrete historiographical cases, 
mostly about German historiography. 
I argue that narrative analysis can be compati-
ble with positivist philosophies of historiography 
because they attempt to answer different ques-
tions and so work on different levels of analysis. 
Narrative philosophies of historiography and the 
positivist approach to the philosophy of histo-
riography share an emphasis on analysing the 
writings of historians, rather than their research 
and methods of inference, confirmation and jus-
tification. 
The basic positivist project was explicative. The 
task of the philosopher was conceived as con-
ceptual explication, the replacement of a famil-
iar but vague and ambiguous concept by a more 
precisely characterised and systematically fruit-
ful and illuminating one. The positivists attempt-
ed to explicate historiographical explanation, 
causation, objectivity etc. Since the positivists 








had already explicated these concepts before examining historiography, it could either corrobo-
rate these explications or be considered vague and ambiguous, all the more in need of philosophic 
explications. Conceptual explication is independent from issues of justification. It is possible to ex-
plicate concepts of explanation or objectivity in a text without having to justify them. For example, 
if every explanation implies a covering law, as Hempel claimed, it does not imply that the expla-
nation or law is true. Only that they are there. For example, if a historian writes that the economic 
success of the Soviet Union is best explained by its system of central planning, the positivist would 
only add that the concept of explanation here assumes a covering law that connects central plan-
ning with economic growth and innovation. 
Likewise, the narrative analysis of historiography remains on the level of the final text and ignores 
research. It analyses literary structures rather than concepts but is just as disjoined from issues 
of justification and explanation. The classical analysis of Hayden White proposed that any historical 
process can be presented in one of four topoi: The history of Poland in the last two centuries can be 
written as a comedy, and the history of California can be written as a tragedy. Obviously the differ-
ence between a tragic and comedic historiography of the same events is textual rather than his-
torical. Evidence and inference would not change a topos once it is established, but at most would 
be fitted to the pre-existing narrative. David Carr suggested that since humans make history, it al-
ready has the structure of a narrative, and so narrative realism is possible. Still, it is obvious that 
more than one type of story can be told about each historical process, even by people who share 
a tradition that binds the storytellers with the objects of the story. Without justification criteria, it is 
impossible to tell which story is right. 
The conceptual and narrative research programmes can be consistent with each other. It is possi-
ble to do at once conceptual and textual analyses. But neither approach to the philosophy of histo-
riography asks the question about the relation of historiography with the evidence. Both assume 
what I call the “strudel and apples” theory of historiography. It is obvious that in order to bake a 
strudel we need apples. Somebody has to grow apple trees and some people have to go to the 
orchard to harvest the fruit. They must choose which apples are ripe enough and which are rotten 
and should be discarded. The apple pickers are necessary and their work important. But they are 
not experts or geniuses. Their work does not require much expertise or even experience. Howev-
er, once the apples are brought to the kitchen, the genius of the chef is displayed in how he works 
with them. How he slices or cooks them, which ingredients are added (cinnamon, raisins etc) and 
how he makes the dough and bakes the strudel. If observers wish to understand why a particular 
strudel is good or bad, they usually study what happens in the kitchen and not what goes on in the 
orchard. Likewise, arguably, when historians walk into the orchard of the archive, they pick and 
choose the ripe “facts” and discard the forged or otherwise unreliable evidence. The facts are col-
lected in a basket and brought to the kitchen of the historian, where the master historian concep-
tualises, slices and combines them to form explanations and pose causal links as well as structure 
them in narrative form. Arguably, if philosophers of historiography are interested in understand-
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ing historiography, they should not pay too much attention to the necessary but boring collection 
of facts, but study the construction of concepts and narratives.
However, there are no ripe and ready “facts” in historiography that the historian can pluck like an 
apple picker can pick ripe fruit off a tree. The archive does not resemble an orchard. It is not made 
of distinct atomic units that need to be selected and gathered, and then sliced and cooked in the 
historian’s narrative workshop. 
Instead, the historian is searching for relevant evidence to infer from representations of the past 
that include explanations and causal relations. Since it is trivially true that all present phenomena 
are the effects of the past, the historian requires information theories that tell which present phe-
nomena are likely to preserve which types of information about the past. The forging of a narrative 
is only the last stage in a long process of inference. Narrative historiography should be compared 
with popular science or at most with scientific textbooks, not with scientific research. As Kuhn 
noted, if we want to understand science, we need to look at what scientists have been doing, at the 
history and sociology of science, rather than at the textbooks that scientists write about their prac-
tices and the histories of their disciplines, which resemble fairytales.
Accordingly, the foundation for the philosophy of historiography should be the history of historiog-
raphy. Philosophers of historiography need to study the actual practices and methodologies of his-
torians, not their rhetoric and ideology. A successful practice of historiography does not constitute 
nor imply theoretical knowledge: successful investors like George Soros and Warren Buffett have 
not made significant contributions to economic theory. Successful politicians have usually not been 
great political theorists, and vice versa. Practitioners possess what Polanyi called “tacit knowledge”, 
a skill that defies articulation and cannot be taught explicitly by oral or written instruction. Profes-
sionals, such as historians, doctors, lawyers, psychiatrists and bankers, attempt to present their 
practices in terms that defend them by fitting them to contemporary models of epistemic legiti-
macy. They are not aware of their own tacit knowledge. Historians have never practiced the sci-
entism they preached in the late nineteenth century, nor the postmodernism they advocated in the 
late twentieth century. Nor was Ranke’s historiography based on Platonic idealism. These were 
just rhetorical figures of speech designed for a particular audience.
Scientific historiography whose methods and results are shared by a uniquely heterogeneous and 
uncoerced consensus emerged with Ranke in the post-Napoleonic era in European history. This 
historiography allied itself with the state, if for no other reason because states were the gatekeep-
ers to the archives. However, European statism, at least before 1848, was not nationalist. Histo-
rians allied themselves with the Enlightenment, rationalising agendas of multinational empires 
against myth, nationalism and religion. Nationalism constructed a historiography of eternal na-
tions whose origins fade into myth. But myth makers like Palacký or Treitschke were not scientific 
historians within the Rankean paradigm. 
Lorenz’s association of scientific historiography with nationalism is highly questionable also be-
cause the methodological origins of Rankean historiography go back to the late eighteenth century, 
to the philological methods of biblical criticism and comparative historical linguistics. All these dis-








ciplines infer representations of common causes from their information-preserving effects in the 
present. They must assume theories about the transmission of information in time; which types of 
information preserve better information when transmitted along causal chains? Biblical criticism 
assumed that the names of God mutated more slowly than other parts of biblical texts. Therefore 
they preserve information about the original parts of the Bible: parts of the same biblical book that 
use different names for God probably originated in different times and places. Comparative his-
torical linguistics assumed that words for immediate family members, fauna and flora and places 
change more slowly than other words and so preserve information about common origins of lan-
guages such as the Indo-European languages. Ranke assumed that eyewitness accounts written 
immediately after the event and not for public consumption, such as diary entries, preserve more 
information than memoirs written years later and for political reasons. All these sciences share 
the inference of representations of common cause tokens from similarities between their infor-
mation-preserving effects in the present. 
Lorenz emphasises the influence of values on historiography. True, all historiography is value lad-
en. But not all values are equal. In scientific historiography, cognitive values form the basis of a 
consensus, together with theories about information transmission in time. The primacy of cognitive 
epistemic values over therapeutic, political, national, religious or other values marks the distinc-
tion between scientific and therapeutic historiography. A large, uniquely heterogeneous and un-
coerced community accepts historiography founded on scientific cognitive values. Historiography 
founded on therapeutic values is accepted by particular homogenous groups that are clearly iden-
tifiable according to their problems and grievances: Holocaust denial is popular among neo-Nazis 
who suffer from guilt for what the Nazis did and have a political interest in dissociating the Nazis 
from mass murder; particular national historical myths are promoted by nationalists of particular 
national identities who suffer from a deficit in heroic prestige; faith in conspiracies is promoted by 
particular groups of people who share a sense of helplessness and meaninglessness as the world 
changes and passes them by. There has always been a market for therapeutic historiography be-
cause people and their institutions will always pay to promote or consume therapeutic accounts 
of their past. The hierarchical struggle for primacy between therapeutic and scientific cognitive val-
ues manifests itself in social conflicts. During the nineteenth century, various forged “ancient” po-
etic documents surfaced in Europe but were exposed despite their therapeutic value for nationalist 
causes. The poems of Ossian, the “Scottish Homer”, were exposed in the early nineteenth century 
as having been written in the previous century by James Macpherson. In the Czech lands, Tomáš 
G. Masaryk participated in exposing similar “ancient” Czech poems as forgeries. These poems 
were written during the Czech struggle for national self-determination to invent a heroic ancient 
Czech history. The universality of the cognitive values of scientific historiography is demonstrated 
by Masaryk’s duel role as the foremost leader of the Czech national movement, who became the 
first president of Czechoslovakia, and as a professional philosopher, who made the most signifi-
cant contribution to the public exposure of the forgeries. 
Legitimate historians, like Masaryk, accept a hierarchy of values, according to which their scientif-
ic cognitive values take precedence over therapeutic values. We may want to believe that a group 
with which we identify has always been virtuous and faultless; and that whatever blemishes we 
find in our group are the product of the evil that was done to us unjustly by some other group(s). 
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But if this involves overriding the critical cognitive values of the historiographical community, this is 
exactly what the uniquely heterogeneous historiographical community should not let us believe in. 
Legitimate historiography is marked by the precedence of critical cognitive values over other val-
ues, not by the absence of other values that generate different historiographical interpretations. 
Indeed, the presence of values in historiographical interpretation is inevitable. As long as the hier-
archical precedence of cognitive over other values is preserved, legitimate historiography can ac-
commodate a myriad of different and conflicting values and ensuing interpretations. 
Historiographical interpretations are affected by the noncognitive values of their authors. This is 
the main reason for the differences between historiographical interpretations of similar topics. 
Yet, agreements among historiographical interpretations on their scientific cores are made pos-
sible by the identical cognitive values they share, and a hierarchy of values that gives precedence 
to cognitive values over other values. Once the requirements of the cognitive values are satisfied, 
there is ample space for personal interpretations, value judgments and expositions of value-laden 
meaning and significance. 
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